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n the early 2010s, Terry Jones of Florida became known for 
his threats to burn, and for eventually burning, the Koran, the 
holy book of Muslims1. The actions and message of the pastor 
eventually attracted the attention of figures as prominent as U.S. 
President Barack Obama and, with transmission around the world 
via the Internet, spread to countries far from the United States like 
Afghanistan and Indonesia2. The response was explosive3. 
The burning of sacred texts such as the Koran provides particularly 
rich opportunities for study by academics in a variety of fields. 
Topics like religion, politics, marginalization, nonverbal 
communication, intercultural communication, and hate speech 
come together. Digital dissemination adds an element of 
contemporary technology to the mix. 
Drawing upon the Florida Koran-burning case, this paper briefly 
examines the constitutional regulation of online hate speech in the 
United States, illustrating how limited the punishment and thus 
regulation of such hate speech generally are. Hate speech is 
discourse that aims to promote hatred based on categories such as 
ethnicity, race, national origin, class, and similar categories4. The 
paper proceeds with a summary of the Florida Koran-burning case, 
continues with a discussion of relevant constitutional principles, 
and then moves to constitutional analyses of the Florida case. 
 
* For a review of the paper, the author thanks Russell L. Weaver. The author presented 
an earlier version of this paper at the Academic Days on Open Government and Digital 
Issues conference at the University of Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne on November 5, 2019. 
© 2020 by Carlo A. Pedrioli. 
Select portions of this paper appeared in prior forms in the following work: C. A. 
PEDRIOLI, “Is incitement on the Internet easier to punish than incitement on television? 
A case study of the Koran-burning of Florida pastor Terry Jones”, in R. L. WEAVER et al. 
(eds.), Free speech, privacy and media: Comparative perspectives, Durham, Carolina Academic 
Press, 2019, pp. 49-62. The author has retained copyright to the earlier work. 
1 K. SIEFF, “Florida pastor Terry Jones’s Koran burning has far-reaching effect”, 
Washington Post, Apr. 2, 2011 
[https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/florida-pastor-terry-joness-koran-
burning-has-far-reaching-
effect/2011/04/02/AFpiFoQC_story.html?utm_term=.58b624b03f28]. 
2 S. CLARKE & R. MCHUGH, “Exclusive: President Obama says Terry Jones’ plan to burn 
Korans is ‘a destructive act’”, ABC News, Sept. 9, 2010 
[https://abcnews.go.com/GMA/president-obama-terry-jones-koran-burning-plan-
destructive/story?id=11589122] (providing video excerpt from interview with Obama); 
SIEFF, vide supra note 1. 
3 SIEFF, vide supra note 1. 
4 M. ROSENFELD, “Hate speech in constitutional jurisprudence: A comparative analysis”, 
Cardozo Law Review, n°24/2003, p. 1523. 
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§ 1 – THE FLORIDA KORAN-BURNING CASE  
Terry Jones of Florida developed an extensive resume regarding 
Koran-burning and the media. In 2010, the fundamentalist 
Christian pastor made headlines around the world when he 
threatened to burn 200 copies of the Koran on the anniversary of 
September 11, 20015. Protests in Afghanistan and Indonesia 
followed, and hundreds of death threats against Jones arrived6. 
Both Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates and General David H. 
Petraeus called Jones, informing him that his actions were risking 
the lives of members of the U.S. Military who were stationed 
overseas7. President Barack Obama claimed that the Koran-
burning “would be ‘a recruitment bonanza for Al Qaeda’”8. 
Echoing Secretary Gates and General Petraeus, the President 
added, “‘As a very practical matter, as commander (in) chief of the 
armed forces of the United States, I just want [Jones] to understand 
that this stunt that he is pulling could greatly endanger our young 
men and women in uniform who are in Iraq, who are in 
Afghanistan’”9. Eventually, Jones chose not to carry out his threat 
at that time10. 
In 2011, Jones changed his course of action. After putting the 
Koran “on trial”, Jones burned a copy of the Muslim holy book, 
live-streaming the event with Arabic subtitles for overseas Muslim 
viewers11. He said that he intended to draw attention to a book that 
he felt was “‘dangerous’”12. “‘We wanted to raise awareness of this 
dangerous religion and dangerous element’”, Jones stated13. In 
 
5 T. ERDBRINK, “Iran denounces Florida pastor over Koran burning”, New York Times, 
Apr. 30, 2012 
[http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/01/world/middleeast/iran-denounces-florida-
pastor-over-koran-burning.html?_r=0];  
R. GOLDMAN, “Who is Terry Jones? Pastor behind ‘Burn a Koran Day’”, ABC News, 
Sept. 7, 2010 
[http://abcnews.go.com/US/terry-jones-pastor-burn-koran-day/story?id=11575665]. 
Because of the potentially offensive nature of the visual images that might have resulted, 
and eventually did result, from coverage of the story, the news media faced an ethical 
problem. See C. CALVERT, “Defining ‘public concern’ after Snyder v. Phelps: A pliable 
standard mingles with news media complicity”, Villanova Sports & Entertainment Law 
Journal, n°19/2012, p. 70. Some news outlets decided to limit the visual images in their 
reporting. B. GLADSTONE, “The Quran-burning coverage conundrum”, National Public 
Radio, Sept. 10, 2010 
[https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=129773873] (offering an 
opinion piece). 
6 A. HULL, “Koran-burning preacher’s pulpit of defiance and chili cheese dogs”, 
Washington Post, Jan. 17, 2015 [https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/koran-
burning-preachers-pulpit-of-deance-and-chili-cheese-dogs/2015/01/17/c98a79e2-
9d9e-11e4-a7ee-526210d665b4_story.html?utm_term=.052d60104d64]. 
7 Ibidem. 
8 CLARKE & MCHUGH, vide supra note 2. 
9 Ibidem. 
10 ERDBRINK, vide supra note 5. 
11 SIEFF, vide supra note 1. 
12 Ibidem. 
13 M. GUTMAN et al., “Pastor Terry Jones receives death threats after Koran burning”, 
ABC News, Apr. 4, 2011 [http://abcnews.go.com/US/pastor-terry-jones-receives-
deaths-koran-burning/story?id=13289242#.UbIvluvQo7A] (providing video of 
interview with Jones). 
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Mazar-e Sharif, Afghanistan, a mob upset about the burning 
attacked a United Nations compound and killed seven employees14. 
Associated protests in Kandahar, Afghanistan, led to the death of 
nine people and injuries to ninety others15. Death threats against 
Jones poured in16. Before burning a copy of the Koran, Jones had 
realized that violent responses might follow his actions17. 
In 2012, he burned several copies of the Koran and an image of 
the Muslim prophet Muhammad18. Jones maintained that the 
purpose of the 2012 burning was to draw attention to the matter 
of a Christian minister who was being held in an Iranian prison19. 
Although not widely announced, the 2012 burning of the Korans 
was live-streamed20. The Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
condemned the actions of Jones, and at least one Iranian politician 
called for the pastor’s execution21. 
Approximately two months earlier, the U.S. Military had, by 
mistake, burned copies of the Koran on an air base outside Kabul, 
Afghanistan22. In Afghanistan and elsewhere, riots had followed 
the accidental burning, and dozens of people had been killed23. 
In 2013, Jones was planning to burn, at a local park, 2,998 copies 
of the Koran, one for every person whom terrorists had killed on 
September 11, 200124. While Jones was on his way to the park in a 
truck, which was towing a barbeque-style grill loaded with 
kerosene-soaked copies of the Koran, police pulled him over and 
arrested him for the felony of unlawful conveyance of fuel25. 
Ultimately, an unlawful conveyance of fuel charge was dismissed, 
and the dismissal was upheld on appeal26. 
The Koran-burning activities of Jones led to restrictions on his 
abilities to travel internationally. For example, in 2011, the U.K. 
Home Office, then led by Home Secretary Theresa May, banned 
Jones from the entering the U.K.27. Jones had planned to speak to 
the group England Is Ours28. The Home Office indicated that “the 
 
14 SIEFF, vide supra note 1. 
15 Ibidem. 
16 GUTMAN et al., vide supra note 13. 
17 SIEFF, vide supra note 1. 
18 ERDBRINK, vide supra note 5. 
19 Ibidem. 
20 Ibidem. 
21 Ibidem. 
22 Ibidem. 
23 Ibidem. 
24 T. LUSH, “Fla. pastor arrested as he prepped to burn Qurans”, USA Today, Sept. 12, 
2013  
[http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/09/11/florida-pastor-burning-
qurans/2802169/]. 
25 Ibidem. 
26 S. SCHOTTELKOTTE, “Court upholds dismissal of charges on controversial pastor Terry 
Jones”, The Ledger, June 27, 2015 
[http://www.theledger.com/news/20150627/court-upholds-dismissal-of-charges-on-
controversial-pastor-terry-jones]. 
27 “US pastor Terry Jones banned from entering UK”, BBC News, Jan. 20, 2011 
[https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-12231832]. 
28 Ibidem. 
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government ‘oppose[d] extremism in all its forms’”29. The 
following year, Canadian authorities prohibited Jones from 
entering Canada via Windsor, Ontario30. They stated that Jones had 
a prior legal infraction in the U.S. and that Germany had filed a 
complaint against Jones31. Several years later, in 2017, Denmark 
banned Jones and several Islamic clerics from entering the country, 
deeming Jones and the others threats to security32. Danish 
Immigration Minister Inger Stojberg used the term “‘hate 
preachers’” in talking about the bans33. 
After most of the media attention had faded, Jones continued to 
be involved in controversy, although in a much less visually 
inflammatory manner. In 2015, he was operating Fry Guys 
Gourmet Fries in the DeSoto Square Mall in Bradenton, Florida34. 
That year, following the terrorist attack on Charlie Hebdo, the 
French magazine that had satirized Muhammad35, Jones used his 
fry stand to promote his anti-Islam views, something which drew 
attention from the local media36. 
In 2017, he briefly drove for ridesharing service provider Uber, 
which maintained that Jones had passed a background check prior 
to being allowed to drive for the company37. Jones admitted that 
he expressed his anti-Islam views to his Uber passengers, but he 
insisted that he only discussed his views if passengers asked him 
about those views38. For self-defense while driving for Uber, Jones 
had in his possession a 9mm pistol39. Following media inquiries, 
Uber suspended Jones while investigating him for discrimination 
and carrying a gun on the job40. Meanwhile, Jones applied to drive 
for Uber competitor Lyft41. 
 
29 Ibidem. 
30 R. BLINCH, “Koran-burning U.S. pastor barred from entering Canada for debate”, 
Reuters, Oct. 11, 2012  
[https://www.reuters.com/article/us-jones-blocked/koran-burning-u-s-pastor-barred-
from-entering-canada-for-debate-idUSBRE89A1MA20121011]. 
31 Ibidem. 
32 T. JENSEN, “Demark bans six ‘hate preachers’ from entering the country”, Reuters, May 
2, 2017 [https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-denmark-security-religion-
idUSKBN17Y1N9]. 
33 Ibidem. 
34 C. SCHELLE, “Florida pastor on al-Qaida hit list opens French fry stand at Bradenton 
Mall”, Miami Herald, Jan. 9, 2015  
[https://www.miamiherald.com/news/state/florida/article5676957.html]. 
35 See, e.g., “Charlie Hebdo: Gun attack on French magazine kills 12”, BBC News, Jan. 7, 
2015 [http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-30710883]; “Charlie Hebdo attack: 
Three days of terror”, BBC News, Jan. 14, 2015 [http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-
europe-30708237]. 
36 F. SIDDIQUI, “The Koran-burning preacher has been driving for Uber”, Washington Post, 
Feb. 4, 2017  
[https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/dr-gridlock/wp/2017/02/04/the-quran-
burning-preacher-has-been-driving-for-
uber/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.f1a15ce922d8]. 
37 Ibidem. 
38 Ibidem. 
39 Ibidem. 
40 Ibidem. 
41 Ibidem. 
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§ 2 – CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES 
As indicated above, hate speech is discourse that aims to promote 
hatred based on categories such as ethnicity, race, national origin, 
class, and similar categories42. In various countries, this type of 
speech has received legal attention primarily since the second half 
of the twentieth century43. The First Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution, as the U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted it, 
generally makes restricting hate speech difficult. This point can be 
seen via the approaches that the Supreme Court has taken toward 
various types of often-overlapping speech. Because the Court has 
afforded great protection to the Internet as well as hate speech in 
general, online hate speech is not easy to regulate. 
One type of speech relevant to regulating hate speech is cross-
burning. While burning a Koran is not precisely the same as 
burning a cross, the two communicative actions have some 
resemblance. Cross-burning in the United States developed in the 
early twentieth century around the time of D. W. Griffith’s film The 
Birth of a Nation and became associated with the white supremacist 
group the Ku Klux Klan, an organization known for its hateful 
messages to African-Americans and other minority groups44. 
Likewise, Koran-burning by non-Muslims sends a hateful message 
to Muslims. Burning a Koran degrades the Koran because the holy 
book is treated as if it were waste material to be incinerated. Of 
note, people have burned books that were considered to be 
heretical, blasphemous, or seditious45. Because of the similarities 
between cross-burning and Koran-burning, using the legal 
standard for cross-burning is appropriate for Koran-burning. 
In Virginia v. Black, the Supreme Court stated that cross-burning 
was expressive conduct46. As such, the government cannot ban all 
cross-burning, although First Amendment protection does not 
apply if the speaker has “the intent to intimidate”47. Conveying “a 
serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful 
violence to a particular individual or group of individuals” is a “true 
threat” such that the government may punish the speech48. The 
Court’s concern was with the motivations of the individual who 
had made the threat, not with the perceptions of the target of the 
threatening communication49. 
Previously, in R.A.V. v. St. Paul, the Court had struck down a local 
ordinance that allowed for the punishment of cross-burning, 
 
42 ROSENFELD, vide supra note 4, at 1523. 
43 F. KÜBLER, “How much freedom for racist speech?: Transnational aspects of a conflict 
of human rights”, Hofstra Law Review, n°27/1998, p. 336. 
44 J. BELL, “O say, can you see: Free expression by the light of fiery crosses”, Harvard Civil 
Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review, n°39/2004, pp. 343-45. 
45 D. CRESSY, “Book burning in Tudor and Stuart England”, Sixteenth Century Journal, 
n°36/2005, p. 374 (observing the lack of success in destroying the ideas in books burned 
in Tudor and Stuart England). 
46 538 U.S. 343, 360 (2003). 
47 Ibidem at 363. 
48 Ibidem at 359-60. 
49 BELL, vide supra note 44, at 368. 
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among other things, “‘which one kn[ew] or ha[d] reasonable 
grounds to know arouse[d] anger, alarm or resentment in others on 
the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender’”50. The Court 
explained that the wording of the statute employed impermissible 
content-based and viewpoint-based discrimination51. 
Fighting words are another type of speech suitable for a discussion 
of regulating hate speech. As the Supreme Court noted in 
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, fighting words include words “which 
by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate 
breach of the peace”52. They are “words likely to cause an average 
addressee to fight”53. A communicator conveys fighting words in a 
face-to-face context54. Fighting words convictions are difficult to 
uphold, and laws that prohibit fighting words often fail because 
they are vague or overly broad55. 
An additional type of speech pertinent to a discussion of hate 
speech is incitement. After experimenting with various 
formulations of the legal standard for at least half a century, the 
Supreme Court eventually settled on a modern formulation in 
Brandenburg v. Ohio56. The Court determined that government may 
not punish advocacy under the category of incitement unless “such 
advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless 
action and is likely to incite or produce such action”57. The 
Brandenburg test has three elements that respectively address intent, 
probability, and proximity58. This formation of the incitement 
standard “is the most speech-protective standard yet evolved by 
the Supreme Court” for this type of speech59. 
In general, the Supreme Court has been skeptical of regulations 
based on the content of speech. For example, the Court struck 
down, in United States v. Stevens, a federal statute that banned 
creating, selling, or possessing depictions of cruelty to animals60; in 
Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association, a state statute that 
criminalized selling or renting violent video games to minors who 
lacked parental consent61; and, in United States v. Alvarez, a federal 
statute that criminalized falsely asserting that one had been 
awarded military honors62. 
 
50 505 U.S. 377, 380 (1992). 
51 Ibidem at 391-92. 
52 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). 
53 Ibidem at 573. 
54 Ibidem. 
55 E. CHEMERINSKY, Constitutional law: Principles and policies, 6th ed., New York, Wolters 
Kluwer, 2019, pp. 1105-06. 
56 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam). 
57 Ibidem at 447. 
58 See C. R. SUNSTEIN, “Constitutional caution”, University of Chicago Legal Forum, 1996, p. 
369. See also S. M. GILLES, “Brandenburg v. State of Ohio: An ‘accidental’, ‘too easy’, and 
‘incomplete’ landmark case”, Capital University Law Review, n°38/2010, pp. 522-25. 
59 G. GUNTHER, “Learned Hand and the origins of modern First Amendment doctrine: 
Some fragments of history”, Stanford Law Review, n°27/1975, p. 955. 
60 559 U.S. 460 (2010). 
61 546 U.S. 786 (2011). 
62 567 U.S. 709 (2012). 
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Overall, the Court’s perspective on hate speech has been consistent 
with a libertarian understanding of speech. Language from case 
law, not limited specifically to the hate speech context, illustrates 
some of the main assumptions. In a prophetic dissent in Abrams v. 
United States, an incitement case, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes 
observed “that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free 
trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is the power of the 
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market”63. 
Many decades later, the Court, having generally adopted a 
Holmesian perspective on speech, addressed flag-burning, which 
some people would find hateful. In Texas v. Johnson, the Court 
explained, “If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First 
Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the 
expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself 
offensive or disagreeable”64. In the same case, the Court added, 
“The way to preserve the flag’s special role is not to punish those 
who feel differently about these matters. It is to persuade them that 
they are wrong”65. 
More than two decades later, in Snyder v. Phelps, the Court 
considered protest speech that included statements like “‘Thank 
God for Dead Soldiers’” and “‘God Hates Fags’”, communicated 
on signs near the funeral of a soldier, which many people would 
consider hate speech66. The Court observed the following: 
Speech is powerful. It can stir people to action, move them 
to tears of both joy and sorrow, and—as it did here—inflict 
great pain. On the facts before us, we cannot react to that 
pain by punishing the speaker. As a nation we have chosen 
a different course—to protect even hurtful speech on 
public issues to ensure that we do not stifle public debate67. 
Accordingly, in cases of offensive speech like hate speech, “the 
remedy to be applied is more speech”, not government 
punishment of speech68. This approach reflects a deep distrust of 
government that dates at least to the beginnings of a nation that 
sought to win its independence from the powerful British 
Empire69. The expectation is that targets of hate speech and their 
allies will respond with counterspeech. Such responsive speech 
“should be the remedy of first resort”70. 
Because the focus of this paper is online hate speech, some 
consideration of the online dimension of the regulation of hate 
speech is now necessary. Since its arrival, the Internet has ushered 
 
63 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919). 
64 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989). 
65 Ibidem at 419. 
66 562 U.S. 443, 448 (2011). 
67 Ibidem at 460-61. 
68 See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S 357, 377 (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
69 E. BARENDT, “Free speech in Australia: A comparative perspective”, Sydney Law Review, 
n°16/1994, p. 157. 
70 R. D. RICHARDS & C. CALVERT, “Counterspeech 2000: A new look at the old remedy 
for ‘bad’ speech”, Brigham Young University Law Review, 2000, p. 586 (italics in original). 
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in a revolution in communication71, making communication more 
democratic72. In general, the Supreme Court has afforded great 
protection to the content of Internet speech, observing, in 
Packingham v. North Carolina, that “the Court must exercise extreme 
caution before suggesting that the First Amendment provides scant 
protection for access to vast networks” on the Internet73. This is so 
because the Internet is among “the most important places (in a 
spatial sense) for the exchange of views”74. 
Various cases have supported this approach. In Reno v. American 
Civil Liberties Union, the Court declared prohibiting indecent 
materials on the Internet to be a violation of the First Amendment, 
as such a prohibition would restrict adult access to the materials75. 
Later, in Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, the Court 
determined that a law that required commercial websites to restrict 
minors’ online access to sexually-oriented material was likely 
unconstitutional because of the impact on adult access to sexually-
oriented materials76. The Court noted the possibility of employing 
filters as opposed to restring access to the materials77. In 
Packingham, on overbreadth grounds, the Court struck down a 
statute that prohibited registered sex offenders from accessing 
commercial social networking websites where the offenders knew 
the websites allowed minors to join the sites or to have personal 
webpages78. 
This brief overview of regulation of online communication 
suggests that the Supreme Court has approached speech on the 
Internet much as the Court had approached speech before the 
advent of the Internet, which was from a generally libertarian 
perspective. Accordingly, given that the Court has been reluctant 
to restrict hate speech, and equally reluctant to restrict online 
speech, one can see that online hate speech is difficult to regulate. 
Of note, the United States has taken a rather different perspective 
on hate speech from the perspectives of other countries, which, 
having greater trust in government, have restricted hate speech 
under values like equality and human dignity79. For instance, while 
the U.S. approach has been toward liberty, the more restrictive 
Canadian approach has been toward equality, dealing with equal 
participation in democracy80. In Regina v. Keegstra, the Canadian 
Supreme Court upheld a criminal conviction for the use of hate 
 
71 See generally R. L. WEAVER, From Gutenberg to the Internet: Free speech, advancing technology, 
and the implications for democracy, 2nd ed., Durham, Carolina Academic Press, 2019. 
72 E. BARENDT, Freedom of speech, 2nd ed., Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 451. 
73 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1736 (2017). 
74 Ibidem at 1735. 
75 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997). 
76 542 U.S. 656, 665, 673 (2004). 
77 Ibidem at 666-68. 
78 137 S. Ct. at 1736-37. 
79 A. STONE, “The comparative constitutional law of freedom of expression”, in T. 
GINSBURG & R. DIXON (eds.), Comparative constitutional law, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 
2011, p. 415. 
80 Ibidem at 417. 
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speech81. Meanwhile, the German approach favors human dignity 
because of Nazi Germany’s treatment of the Jewish people and 
other disfavored groups82. So strong is the post-World War II 
German commitment to human dignity that the German 
Constitution’s expression of the value may not be amended83. Israel 
and many countries in Europe have laws that ban Holocaust 
denial84. In general, different histories have informed different 
approaches to hate speech85. 
§ 3 – CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSES 
This paper now applies the above constitutional principles to the 
facts of the Florida Koran-burning case to determine whether the 
Koran-burning of Jones could be punished as any of the types of 
speech previously discussed. The analyses will show that 
punishment most likely would not be possible. 
Under the doctrine on cross-burning, which is similar to Korn-
burning, punishment probably would be impermissible. As 
indicated previously, the U.S. Supreme Court has stated that the 
government may punish cross-burning if there is an intent to 
intimidate86. If Jones is taken at face value, his intent was to warn 
people about what he thought were the dangers of the Koran and 
Islam87. He also wanted to raise awareness of the imprisonment of 
a Christian pastor in Iran88. 
Also of note, while cross-burning may be particularly serious on 
the lawn of a targeted African-American family89, Jones burned the 
Koran well away from the homes of the Muslims who eventually 
comprised at least a part of his audience. He was in Florida, and, 
since he livestreamed the burning, audience members were around 
the world90. The proximity that might suggest an intent to 
intimidate was not present in an Internet message the way it would 
be on the front lawn of a targeted family. According, in the absence 
of evidence of an intent to intimidate, the communication of Jones 
could not be punished under the doctrine on cross-burning. 
Moreover, punishment under the doctrine on fighting words, 
which are words that “by their very utterance inflict injury or tend 
to incite an immediate breach of the peace”91, would be 
unsuccessful. The definition of fighting words is limited to the 
 
81 3 S.C.R. 697 (1990). 
82 STONE, vide supra note 79, at 417. 
83 German Constitution, 1949, §§ 1(1), 79(3)  
[https://www.btg-bestellservice.de/pdf/80201000.pdf]. 
84 E. BARENDT, “Freedom of expression”, in M. ROSENFELD & A. SAJO (eds.), The Oxford 
handbook of comparative constitutional law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 903. 
The United Kingdom does not have a law that prohibits Holocaust denial. BARENDT, vide 
supra note 72, at 177. 
85 BARENDT, “Freedom of expression”, vide supra note 84, at 904. 
86 Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 363 (2003). 
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face-to-face context92. The Koran-burning of Jones was not in a 
face-to-face context. Jones livestreamed his Koran-burning 
message around the world via the Internet93. While Jones was in 
Florida, many members of his audience were in places like 
Afghanistan and Indonesia94. As such, he could not literally have 
been in the faces of the Muslim members of his audience, and the 
fighting words doctrine would not provide justification for 
punishing the speech. 
Additionally, punishment under the incitement doctrine probably 
would not be feasible. As indicated above, the three-part test from 
Brandenburg v. Ohio states that government may not punish advocacy 
under the category of incitement unless “such advocacy is directed 
to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to 
incite or produce such action”95. 
First, if one takes him at his word, Jones did not have the intent to 
bring about imminent lawless action. Brandenburg does not 
specifically call for the lawless action to be serious96, but one can 
read the case that way97. The intent Jones had was to warn people 
about what he thought were the dangers of the Koran and Islam98. 
He also wanted to raise awareness of the imprisonment of a 
Christian pastor in Iran99. Jones seems to have been aware that his 
actions might result in serious harm100, but such awareness would 
be insufficient to constitute the requisite intent to bring about 
imminent lawless action. 
Second, the communication of Jones was likely to incite or produce 
lawless action. The Supreme Court has not elaborated on the 
probability component of Brandenburg101. However, as Justice 
Oliver Wendell Holmes observed decades before Brandenburg, 
“Every idea . . . offers itself for belief and if believed it is acted on 
unless some other belief outweighs it or some failure of energy 
stifles the movement at its birth”102. If more people receive 
exposure to the idea offered, the likelihood of resulting harm is 
greater103. When enough upset people are in one place at a given 
time, violence can result. In this case, many Muslims presumably 
had strong feelings about their faith and were prone to become 
upset if they felt that their faith had received an insult. Moreover, 
by the time he burned the Koran in 2011, Jones already had 
 
92 Ibidem at 573. 
93 SIEFF, vide supra note 1. 
94 CLARKE & MCHUGH, vide supra note 2. 
95 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam). 
96 F. S. HAIMAN, Speech and law in a free society, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1981, 
p. 277. 
97 M. E. KAMINSKI, “Incitement to riot in the age of flash mobs”, University of Cincinnati 
Law Review, n°81/2012, p. 45. 
98 SIEFF, vide supra note 1; GUTMAN et al., vide supra note 13. 
99 ERDBRINK, vide supra note 5. 
100 SIEFF, vide supra note 1. 
101 T. HEALY, “Brandenburg in a time of terror”, Notre Dame Law Review, n°84/2009, p. 713. 
102 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
103 SUNSTEIN, vide supra note 58, at 370-71. 
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received international media attention the previous year104. Thus, 
many people in predominantly Muslim countries, as well as in the 
U.S. and elsewhere, had their eyes on him. A strong response from 
displeased Muslims somewhere was likely. Indeed, in 2011, when 
protests turned violent, lawless action did follow in Mazar-e Sharif 
and Kandahar, Afghanistan105. 
Third, whether potential lawless activity was imminent in the Jones 
case would be hard to determine. Although Brandenburg does not 
allow the government to punish the “advocacy of illegal action at 
some indefinite future time”106, the constitutional definition of 
imminence is vague, potentially referring to a matter of seconds, 
minutes, or hours107. Regardless, with the diversity of the potential 
audience of the communication, including Muslims and Muslim 
allies around the world, whether a response, if any, would occur 
almost at once or later was unknown at the time of the Koran-
burning. For instance, people could have taken to the streets in 
anger almost immediately or planned mass rallies for later dates. 
With hindsight, one can note that violence did accompany several 
protests in Afghanistan over the burning, although the violence 
occurred nearly two weeks after the burning108, which would not 
have constituted imminence. 
Accordingly, punishing the communication under the incitement 
doctrine most likely would be infeasible. While a likelihood of 
inciting or producing lawless action was present, Jones lacked the 
intent to bring about imminent lawless action, and a determination 
of imminence of the potential lawless activity would be difficult to 
make. 
In summary, whether under the doctrine on flag-burning, fighting 
words, or incitement, the speech of Jones would be unlikely to be 
punishable. While livestreaming the message created more 
controversy around the world, sending out the message in that 
manner did not make punishment, and thus regulation, more likely. 
CONCLUSION 
Drawing upon the Florida Koran-burning case for illustrative 
purposes, this paper has provided a succinct overview of the 
regulation of online hate speech in the U.S. on constitutional 
grounds. As the paper has illustrated, the U.S. perspective on hate 
speech generally has been libertarian in nature and focused away 
from values like equality and human dignity that other legal systems 
have chosen to protect to a greater degree. In the U.S., 
 
104 ERDBRINK, vide supra note 5. 
105 SIEFF, vide supra note 1. 
106 Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973). In Hess, the Supreme Court determined 
that, at a war protest on a university campus, neither “‘We’ll take the fucking street later’” 
nor “‘We’ll take the fucking street again’” was sufficient to justify punishment. Ibidem at 
106-09. Among other defects in the government’s case was the lack of imminence. Ibidem 
at 108-09. 
107 KAMINSKI, vide supra note 97, at 44. 
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counterspeech is the preferred remedy for hate speech. To date, 
the advent of the Internet has not changed the Supreme Court’s 
general approach to hate speech. Consequently, discourse like that 
of Terry Jones, offensive as it is to many people, is, for the most 
part, hard to regulate via punishment. As comparative perspectives 
on hate speech indicate, other approaches are possible, but the 
United States, deeply suspicious of government, has remained 
libertarian in its approach to hate speech, both online and 
otherwise. 
 
 
